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I.

Introduction

In an address to the Danbury Baptist Association in the State of Connecticut, Thomas
Jefferson famously wrote of the “wall of separation between church in state” while advocating
for religious liberty. He wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the
legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a
wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the
supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties.1
In his brief letter, Jefferson highlighted the contradictory language in the First Amendment; the
concern of the Framers that government should not promote a single religion over another, while
simultaneously recognizing the right of every American to freely worship whatever religion they
choose. Justice Roberts, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, aptly summarized this interrelationship.
Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated, “On the one hand, [the First Amendment] forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
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Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptists, Jan 1, 1802, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
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free exercise of the chosen form of religion.”2 The conflict between the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses has culminated in impassioned debates about the use of prayer in schools and
school-related events.
In 1992, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman held that the inclusion of clergy who offer
prayers as part of a graduation ceremony at a public school violates the Establishment Clause. 3
What some viewed as a resolution to the debate regarding prayer at school ceremonies only gave
birth to another issue, whether student-composed and delivered prayers at graduation was
constitutional. As a result, circuit courts have become split on the question of whether a student
may, without involvement from the school, decide to include prayer as part of a school-related
event.4
This paper will not attempt to disturb the well-settled principle that school-sponsored
prayer contravenes the First Amendment. Rather, because of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of choice and exercise of religion, mechanisms should be recognized which allow for
student-initiated prayer in certain contexts. More specifically, this paper argues that studentsponsored prayer delivered at graduation ceremonies without involvement from the school is
constitutional. The first section of this paper will analyze the constitutional framework
underlying the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, including the tests the Court has used to
determine constitutionality. The second part will address the interpretations offered by different
circuit courts. Third, the argument will be put forth that student-initiated prayer at graduation
ceremonies should be recognized as private speech, and a vote to include this prayer should not
be constitutionally problematic. Finally, by changing the facts of Lee v. Weisman to create
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different hypotheticals, this paper will show that students unilaterally electing to include and
deliver prayer as part of a graduation ceremony pass any of the Establishment Clause tests
proffered by the Supreme Court.
II.

Constitutional Framework Underlying the Establishment Clause

Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, at best, disorderly. Current
confusion surrounding the proper analysis is in large part due to the fact the Court has never
settled on one controlling test. Rather, using multiple standard s, Establishment Clause cases have
largely been decided on fact-specific grounds. Analysis of the various standards employed by the
Court will begin with School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, where the Court announced
the underlying principle of the Establishment Clause, neutrality.5 In that case, the Court
considered consolidated cases wherein state actions required schools begin the day with readings
from the Bible.6 Despite both states’ statutes allowing for students to be excused from the
reading upon request from a parent or guardian, the Court held the statutes to be in violation of
the Establishment Clause.7 In both instances, the state required the religious exercises as part of
the curricular activities of students who were required by law to attend school under the
supervision and participation of teachers. 8 That a student could be excused from the exercise, the
Court held, did not lessen the violation.9 In its Establishment Clause analysis, the Court placed
great emphasis on the “neutral position in which the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment place our government[.]”10 In striking down the statutes, the Court stated,
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374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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9 Id. at 225.
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“[t]he test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”11 Because the States were requiring
the reading of a prayer at schools where students’ attendance was required, and thus promoting
religion, the wall of neutrality had been breached.12
After emphasizing the neutrality of the State as the guidepost, the Court announced a
three-prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman to deal with Establishment Clause challenges. 13 Under
this test, laws must satisfy three different prongs: (1) they must have a secular purpose; (2) they
must have no primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) there must be no
excessive entanglement between church and state. 14 The first two prongs requiring a secular
purpose and neutrality were already in place following the Court’s decision in Schempp.15 In
adding the entanglement prong, the Court reinforced a concern for the potential of government
directing or supporting religious entities.16 The Lemon test, however, has been maligned by
courts and academics for the indeterminacy of its standards. 17
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Id. at 222.
Id. at 226.
13 403 U.S 602 (1971).
14 Id. at 612-613.
15 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
16 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
17 See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 1621, 1628–
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or an effect “primary,” id. at 1628); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080-81 (2019) (plurality
opinion); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
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Since Lemon, the Court has turned to a more fact-specific inquiry which looks to history
for guidance.18 The Court in these cases has reasoned that the historical practice of prayer, for
instance in the context of legislative sessions, is deeply-rooted in the history of American
government. The same reliance on tradition has been used in other contexts, like in American
Legion, where the court noted, “monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history
follow in the tradition of the First Congress in respecting and tolerating different views, and
endeavoring to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and recognizing the important role
religion plays in the lives of many Americans[.]”19
The Court has also employed the endorsement test, which looks to whether a reasonable
observer would think the government has, through its actions, expressed endorsement or
disapproval of religion.20 In her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O’Connor correctly noted that a
focus on endorsement offers clarity to the Lemon test as an analytical device.21 A focus on
endorsement is reasonable; situations where the State seemingly encourages adherence to a
certain religious orthodoxy as it relates to an individual’s standing in the community are
concerning. However, this test has also been subject to similar criticisms as Lemon; it presents
certain vagaries since the “reasonable observer” is a subjective term. 22 As endorsement’s
prevalence as an Establishment Clause test has declined, yet another test has emerged:
coercion.23

18

Supreme Court cases regarding prayer before legislative sessions are illustrative. See e.g., Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983); Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
19 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 204.
20 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, (1984).
21 “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.” Id.
22 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (“[H]ow ‘reasonable’ must our ‘reasonable observer’ be, and what exactly qualifies
as impermissible endorsement of religion in country where ‘In God We Trust’ appears on the coinage, the eye of
God appears in its Great Seal[.]”) (GORSUCH, J., concurring).
23 Note, The Establishment Clause and the Chilling Effect, 133 H ARV. L. R EV. 1338 (2020).
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Justice Kennedy first articulated the coercion test in County of Alleghany v. ACLU, where
he concurred and dissented in part.24 Writing about why coercion is one of the limiting principles
of the Establishment clause, Justice Kennedy said, “it would be difficult indeed to establish a
religion without some measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to
supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to
observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.” 25
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alleghany also recognized a distinction between direct and indirect
coercion.26 Direct coercion can be an explicit sanction, either monetary or criminal, for not
conforming to preferred religious behavior, while indirect coercion may be less overt actions
which nevertheless encroach on religious freedom. 27
Justice Kennedy’s focus on coercion was adopted in Lee, where he authored the opinion
for the Court.28 In Lee, a middle school principal invited a Rabbi to offer a prayer at the
graduation ceremony for her class pursuant to a district policy. 29 The Rabbi was given a
pamphlet with “guidelines” for the composition of the prayer at a civic ceremony and advised
him to make the prayer nonsectarian.30 The Rabbi’s invocation and benediction were
nonsectarian with a few references to “God” and the “Lord”. 31 In striking down the school policy
Justice Kennedy discussed the indirect and subtle social pressures placed upon students because
they had no real alternative to attending the ceremony.32 Further, the Court cited the school’s
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492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 662.
26 Ward, supra note 17 at 1631.
27 Id.
28 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
29 Id. at 581.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 582.
32 Id. at 588.
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direction over the religious speech, namely the “guidelines” given by the principal to the Rabbi,
as evidence of content-control by the State.33
Just eight years later in Sante Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, the Court took up a
case regarding yet another incident of prayer in the school context, only this time it was a student
delivering the message.34 In Sante Fe, the school district allowed students to read Christian
invocations at graduation ceremonies, and a student who is elected to the office of student
council Chaplin to deliver a prayer over the public address system before each football game for
the season.35 The district court entered an interim order providing that a non-denominational
prayer consisting of an invocation and or benediction could be delivered by students selected by
the graduation class.36 While the text of the prayer was not allowed to be preapproved or
scrutinized by the school, overt references to religious figures was permissible so long as the
general tenor of the speech was non-proselytizing.37 In response to the district court order, the
school district enacted a series of policies which provided, in part:
The board has chosen to permit the graduating senior class, with the advice and
counsel of the senior class principal or designee, to elect by secret ballot to choose
whether an invocation and benediction shall be part of the graduation exercise. If
so chosen the class shall elect by secret ballot, from a list of student volunteers,
students to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions
for the purpose of solemnizing their graduation ceremonies. 38
The policy adopted for football games was similar to the above policy for graduation. 39 Although
the Fifth Circuit found both policies unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
limited to the question only of whether the policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer
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39 Id. at 297.
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at football games violates the Establishment Clause. 40 While acknowledging this case presented
a slightly different set of circumstances – with the student prayer at a different type of school
function – the Court made clear its analysis “is properly guided by the principles [] endorsed in
Lee.”41 In striking down the school policy, the Court determined that similar coercive pressures
which existed in Lee arose in this case.42 Bandmembers, cheerleaders, and fans alike could feel
socially coerced to participate in the religious invocation which is being sanctioned by the
school, thereby resulting in the State coercing participation in an act of religious worship. 43
Relevant to the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the Department of
Education’s Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and Religious Expression in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools (the “2020 Guidelines”). Section 8524(a) of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (“ESEA”) requires the Secretary of Education to issue
information to and guidance on the current state of the law concerning religious expression in
public schools to State educational agencies. 44 The 2020 Guidelines reiterate well-established
principles of the Establishment Clause, such as “teachers and other public school officials, acting
in their official capacities, may not lead their classes in prayer, devotional readings from the
Bible, or other religious activities, nor may school officials use their authority to attempt to
persuade or compel students to participate in prayer or other religious activities.”45 The 2020
Guidelines do note, however, that “nothing in the Constitution … prohibits any public school
student from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday…. Students
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Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
42 Id. at 312.
43 Id.
44 U.S. Department of Education: Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and Religious Expression in
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools (2020).
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/religionandschools/prayer_guidance.html.
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may also speak to, and attempt to persuade, their peers about religious topics just as they do with
regard to political topics.”46 This language is more welcoming of student-initiated prayer than
perhaps the Court’s precedent would seem. Indeed, the 2020 Guidelines even go so far as to say
that where the school permits content-neutral student religious expression, and the student retains
control of the content of the speech, the speech is not attributable to the school nor can it be
restricted.47
Speaking specifically about the use of prayer at graduation, the 2020 Guidelines offer
contradictory advice from the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This section states:
School officials may not mandate or organize prayer at graduation or select
speakers for such events in a manner that favors religious speech such as prayer.
Where students or other private graduation speakers are selected on the basis of
genuinely content-neutral, evenhanded criteria and retain primary control over the
content of their expression, however, that expression is not attributable to the
school and therefore may not be restricted because of its religious (or antireligious) content and may include prayer. To avoid any mistaken perception that
a school endorses student or other private speech that is not in fact attributable to
the school, school officials may make appropriate, neutral disclaimers to clarify
that such speech (whether religious or nonreligious) is the speaker's and not the
school's speech.48
Perhaps most notable is the 2020 Guidelines’ suggestion that the school providing a neutral
disclaimer will serve as protection from an Establishment Clause violation. 49 The Court in Lee
took specific issue with this exact decision by the school district when they gave Rabbi
Gutterman guidelines for his speech.50 Where the Court has held that this amounts to the school
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Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 In his remarks announcing the Guidelines issues by the Department of Education, President Trump said, “ today,
my administration is issuing strong new guidance to protect religious liberty in our public schools. The right of
students and teachers to freely exercise their faith will always be protected, including the right to pray.” President
Donald J. Trump, “President Trump Remarks on Constitutional Prayer in Schools”, C-SPAN transcript, Jan. 16,
2020. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-announcement-guidanceconstitutional-prayer-public-schools/.
50 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
47
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directing and controlling the content of speech, the 2020 Guidelines put forth by the Department
of Education advise that it is, in fact, safe policy. 51 Further, the 2020 Guidelines suggest that it
may be permissible for a school to have a process by which it selects a speaker, and that speaker
ends up giving a religious speech.52 So long as the process by which the speaker is chosen is
content-neutral and the speaker retains control over the content of the speech itself, this is
allowed. This conclusion stands opposed to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Sante Fe
Independent School Dist. v. Doe.53 This part of the case will be discussed in more detail below;
however, it is relevant now simply for its holding – that the school’s voting process to determine
which student delivers a prayer before a football game is unconstitutional. 54 The 2020 Guidelines
do not appear to proscribe such a selection process, so long as the elected speaker controls what
they say and the school does not endorse the speech. 55
As will be discussed below, circuit courts have applied various tests when deciding the
constitutionality of student-led prayer at graduation. In my view, the school always advances or
inhibits religion anytime it is at all involved in the student-led prayer. Indeed, courts often cite
the potential for “sponsorship” by the school were it to allow a student to give a religious speech
as a justification for upholding a ban or policy.56 This concern is well-founded, but it need not
exist were the school to adhere to the original guidepost of neutrality. In each of the circuit
decisions discussed below, were the school to have refrained from any involvement, they would
have avoided acting in any way as to denote “sponsoring” the religious speech at issue or to have
been “coercing” students.
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2020 Guidelines supra note 44.
Id.
53 530 U.S. at 317.
54 Id.
55 2020 Guidelines supra note 44.
56 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (stating that one of “the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection [is] sponsorship[.]) (quotations omitted).
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a. Circuit Interpretation on Student-Initiated Prayer
Lee narrowly resolved the issue of whether prayer is acceptable at graduation only in the
context of a school official “direct[ing] the performance of formal religious exercise for
secondary schools.”57 In an effort to evade Lee’s fact-sensitive holding, students have
unilaterally made the decision to include prayer at school-sponsored events. Given the uncertain
direction from the Supreme Court as to which standard is guiding in this context, the question of
whether student-initiated prayer absent any encouragement from the school contravenes the
Establishment clause has led to a divide among the circuits.
The Fifth Circuit was the first to take up this question in Jones v. Clear Creek Indep.
Schs., the same year that Lee was decided.58 This case came before the Supreme Court
immediately following Lee, but was remanded so that the Fifth Circuit could appropriately
address the issue considering the Supreme Court’s decision. 59 In this case, a high school
traditionally included in its graduation ceremonies invocations and benedictions which were
voluntarily crafted and presented by students of the graduating class. 60 Three weeks prior to the
graduation ceremony, the Board of Trustees adopted a Resolution which provided, among other
things, that the use of a benediction is within the discretion of the graduating class, it will be
given by a student volunteer, and it shall be nonsectarian and non-proselytizing in nature.61 Upon
remand, the Fifth Circuit reanalyzed the Resolution under the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion
tests.62 Under all three, the court held that the Resolution does not violate the Establishment
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Lee, 505 U.S. at 586; Kevin E. Broyles, Establishment of Religion and High School Graduation Ceremonies: Lee
v. Weisman, 16 H ARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 279 (1993) (explaining how Lee only resolved the issue of school
officials inviting clergymen to deliver prayers).
58 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
59 Id. at 965.
60 Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 417 (1991).
61 Id.
62 Jones, 977 F.2d at 966.
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clause.63 Of particular importance to the court was the crucial fact that the students themselves
were deciding the type of invocation given, and the Resolution explicitly disallowed any
sectarian or proselytizing prayer.64
The Fifth Circuit in Jones was partially correct in its ultimate determination. It is true that
because the students themselves oversaw selecting the type of invocation, crafting it, and
delivering it without any input from the school, then it cannot be said there is any advancing of
religion (Lemon), endorsement, or coercion by the school. Where the Fifth Circuit partially erred,
however, is in its conclusion that the Resolution shielded the school from any Establishment
clause violation. While the school district in Jones surely was well-intentioned and attempting to
abide by the “neutrality” principle guiding the Establishment clause, any action by the school
risks the potential for entanglement. To be sure, Lemon prohibits “excessive entanglement” as
part of the tri-part Establishment clause test. The proper course of action, however, is for the
school district to adhere to “neutrality” strictly because any school involvement can be viewed as
“excessive”.
The Third Circuit in Am. C.L. Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of
Educ., reached the opposite conclusion when considering a district’s policy.65 Responding
directly to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jones, the school board proposed a policy where the
graduating student would choose whether to include a prayer at graduation, a student volunteer
would give the prayer, and the school is not allowed to endorse or promote the prayer in any
way.66 The senior class voted by a narrow margin, 128 to 120 (with 20 voting neither), to include
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See id.
Id.
65 See Am. C.L. Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).
66 Id. at 1475.
64
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the prayer.67 In considering the free speech rights of the students, the Third Circuit took issue
with the student-voting mechanism the school employed. “[The school policy] allowed the 128
seniors who wanted verbal prayer at their graduation to impose their will upon 140 of their
fellow classmates who did not.”68 The court next looked at the policy to see the level of state
control over the ceremony and whether the students were coerced. 69 Determining that the student
vote does not erase the state’s imprint from the ceremony, and there is public and peer pressure
placed on students, the court held the policy violated the Establishment Clause. 70
The Third Circuit is partially correct regarding the student vote. As with Jones, whenever
a school enacts a policy, no matter how well-intentioned, it runs the risk of entanglement. At its
most basic roots, any school policy on prayer during graduation is in some way interacting with
students’ expression of religion. Even if the policy, as in this case, explicitly bars the
endorsement of a student’s religious statement, it can be misconstrued as a tacit approval of the
message.71 Given the potential Establishment Clause violation that could occur, schools would
be wise to not entertain any policy, simply allowing the students to unilaterally decide to include
religious messages in graduation speeches on their own. Where the Third Circuit erred, however,
is in its conclusion that the school is coercing the students in any way. Certainly, graduations
themselves are not truly “voluntary”; they are the culmination and celebration of a student’s
academic career. Regardless of tradition or social pressure, which might compel a student to
attend a graduation, participation in a religious invocation at that graduation is a separate action.
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Id.
Id. at 1477.
69 Id. at 1479.
70 See id.
71 Nevertheless, this policy should not have been read as the having “the state’s imprint.”
68
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In this case, the school strived to achieve neutrality and in no way encouraged the participation
in prayer or adherence to a specific religious orthodoxy.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Adler v. Duval County School Bd., upheld a county’s policy of
allowing students to vote whether to include prayer at graduation. The county policy was similar
to the policy in Jones; discretion whether to include a prayer rests with the senior class, it will be
given by a student volunteer, and if the class chooses to include a prayer it will not be monitored
or reviewed by the school.72 In upholding the County’s policy, the court employed a combination
of the coercion and endorsement tests. 73 Critical to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, was that the
prayers were not subject to regulations on their topic or content, and that the policy did not
encourage religious messages.74 Because the school was entirely removed in the crafting and
delivering of the prayer, it could not be said to have been endorsing or encouraging the
participation of the religious speech.75 The school district in Adler corrected the mistake made in
Jones. By removing itself entirely from the decision to include and drafting of the prayer, it stood
firmly neutral.

III.

Why Student-Initiated Prayer Is Private Speech

One of the challenges surrounding school suppression of student religious speech is
determining at what point this speech no longer is private speech, but government speech
endorsing religion.76 It is well settled that private religious speech is fully protected under the
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Adler v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001).
See id.
74 Id. at 1336.
75 Id. at 1338.
76 Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765 (1995) (“[T]here is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”) (citations omitted).
73
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Free Speech Clause as private expression.77 The right to use government property for personal
expression depends, however, upon whether the property “has by law or tradition been given the
status of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses.” 78 The issue here
turns, therefore, on whether a graduation ceremony is considered a public forum.
The Court has recognized a category of limited public fora which the state has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity. 79 For example, in Widmar v. Vincent, the
Court considered whether a state university, which allows registered student groups access to
school facilities, may close the facilities to student groups who want to use them for religious
discussion and worship.80 The Court declared in Widmar that student meetings which included
prayer and religious discussion, “are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment.”81 Just a few years later in Mergens, the Court addressed a similar question;
whether the Equal Access Act prohibited a high school from denying student religious groups
permission to meet on school grounds during noninstructional time. 82 While reaffirming the
“limited public forum” discussed in Widmar, the Court recognized that Congress used a separate
phrase – “limited open forum” – as the operative phrase in the statute.83 The Court struck down
the high school’s policy on statutory grounds, noting that the Equal Access Act “prohibits denial
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See e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 352 (1993); Board of Ed. of
Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102
(1981); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
78 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761.
79 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School District v.
Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater).
80 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
81 Id. at 269.
82 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231.
83 Id. at 242.
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of equal access…to…any students who wish to conduct a meeting within [the school’s] limited
open forum on the basis of the religious content of the speech[.]” 84
Both Widmar and Mergens overtly state there exists a limited public forum in which free
speech, which includes religious speech, must be allowed. That proposition, coupled with the
Court taking a relaxed approach in Town of Greece towards a legislative body opening a session
with prayer, leads to a possible conclusion that student-initiated speech in the graduation context
would be considered private speech within a limited public forum. The same conclusion that the
Court reached in Widmar can be drawn here. An open-forum policy which included no
discrimination against religious speech would have a secular purpose and avoid entanglement
with religion. If a school aimed to bar a student from including in their graduation speech any
religious statements, it would risk greater entanglement than if the school maintained neutrality
within this limited public forum. This is similar to the conclusion drawn in Sante Fe, where it
found critical the “degree of school involvement” which made clear the prayer bore “the imprint
of the State[.]”85 In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, Justice Scalia recognized
the distinction between private speech and government speech cannot exist where the
government has not “fostered or encouraged the [speech].” 86 As has been repeatedly pointed out,
what more efficient way is there for the government to not encourage religious speech than to
avoid involvement entirely? In the graduation ceremony context, the time where a student begins
to address his or her fellow classmates could be recognized as another example of a limited
public forum. If, for instance, this student was the valedictorian, the school would not be
designating the speaker based on a specific viewpoint or what speech they plan to give. It would

84

Id. at 247.
Sante Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
86 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
85
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be an opportunity for a student who, through extraordinary academic achievement, has earned
the right to address his or her peers. Any further announcement by the school would be
unnecessary, as it has presumably already made clear that the valedictorian will be given a
chance to speak before the graduating class and any attendees. Under these circumstances, a
student speaker would merely be taking advantage of an already recognized forum where they
are given a chance to speak.
In a limited public forum, the State “may impose restrictions on speech that are
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” 87 By barring students from speaking at a graduation entirely
because they might give a religious speech, the State is discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.
The Court has recognized certain categories of student speech which may be regulated under
certain circumstances: vulgar speech, speech which materially disrupts the classroom and causes
a substantial disruption, speech promoting illegal drug use, and speech that may reasonably be
seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school such as a school newspaper. 88
A student giving a religious speech at a graduation certainly would not fall into the first
three categories. First, a student who stands before his or her fellow classmates and gives a
religious invocation is not engaging in the “lewd” or “vulgar” speech uttered in Fraser.89
Looking next at Tinker, there the Court was concerned with passive political speech which, it
was argued, could cause a disruption to the classroom.90 A student speaking at a graduation
cannot cause a disruption to the classroom. They are, by definition, progressing out of the control
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of the school along with their fellow graduating classmates. Third, while the student in Morse,
was punished for holding up a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school approved
event, he was ultimately punished for promoting drug use, not any perceived religious message. 91
Moreover, the student in that case did not even try to argue he was attempting to convey a
religious message with the banner.92 A student reciting a Gospel passage or scripture from the
Quran would present entirely different circumstances.
An argument could be made, however, that observers might believe that the student
speaking at the graduation came with the approval of the school administration as in Hazelwood.
There, a school chose not to publish two articles written by students which dealt with the
pregnancies of students at the school and the impact of divorce on children. 93 The Court held the
school was able to exercise editorial control over the content of the student speech because the
public could reasonably have perceived it to bear the school’s imprimatur. 94 But the
circumstances surrounding a student speaker and a graduation invitee are distinct. Someone who
is invited to give an invocation or speak to the graduation class is, in effect, an agent of the
school. The individual’s message will be, correctly, interpreted as coming directly from the
school itself. Conversely, when a student stands to deliver a message to his or her peers, the
reasonable observer would understand that whatever message is delivered is coming purely from
the student. Often these students are either selected by their peers to deliver an address, or have
earned the ability to do so as a valedictorian due to their academic excellence. The circumstances
surrounding why a student appears before the graduating class and an administrator or outside
individual are not equivalent. Therefore, when a student, on their own, chooses to include
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religious messages in a graduation speech, this should be recognized as private speech and
schools should not attempt to silence the student.

IV.

Why A Student-Led Vote to Determine Whether A Prayer Should Be Included In a
Graduation Is Not Constitutionally Problematic
The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has correctly recognized the potential

for coercion as a legitimate concern with governmental advancement of religion. Where the
Court has strayed, however, is placing great weight on how severe this coercion can be when the
government is removed from the equation.95 In his dissent in Lee, where the Court explicitly
used the coercion test for its decision, Justice Scalia argued that the type of coercion originally
contemplated by the Framers is not the type of coercion which receives strong consideration by
the Court today. “The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”96
Justice Thomas echoed this sentiment in his concurrence in Town of Greece. “[T]o the extent
coercion is relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, it is actual legal coercion that counts –
not the subtle coercive pressures[.]”97 This distinction between true coercion – that which comes
with the force of law and threat of penalty – and social pressure masked as coercion has been lost
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in recent Establishment Clause cases. By broadening the definition of coercion, the Court has
allowed threat of peer pressure to serve as a potential bar to student’s speech.
As this definition has been broadened, practices which should have insulated the school
from Establishment Clause violations became questionable policy. The Court in both Sante Fe
Independent School Dist. v. Doe, and Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,
stated that student elections deciding which expressive activities prevail are constitutionally
problematic.98 Although these cases dealt with student expression in other school-related
contexts (prayer before a football game and use of student fees for student groups promoting
religious ideology), the Court determined in both instances that a student-voting mechanism runs
afoul of the Establishment Clause.
In Sante Fe, The Court first engaged an analysis of whether the student’s prayer before
the football game can be considered “private speech”. 99 Crucial to its’ determination that this is
not private speech, was the finding that the invocations “are authorized by a government
policy[.]”100 This policy allowed for one student to give an invocation before every game, subject
to specific regulations which restrict the topic and content of the message. 101 Because the policy
put the rights of students to a vote, the policy was an insufficient safeguard of student speech.
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to a platform pursuant to a set standard of guidelines and restrictions, the Court’s precedent
confirms that there is serious potential for Establishment Clause violations. Where there is not
policy in place, and students simply decide on their own who will be a speaker and let the
speaker unilaterally decide what message will be delivered, there is no control by the school.
Further, while the Court has settled that “[a]ccess to a public forum, for instance, does not
depend upon majoritarian consent[,]” without implementation of a policy like in Sante Fe, access
to the forum would not be dependent on a voting-mechanism.103 Rather, the message delivered is
dependent on student-voting. Access to the forum (such as a graduation speech) is not limited by
the school, instead the speech itself will be determined by the students.
In striking down the school policy in Sante Fe, the Court stated that it was guided by the
coercion principles endorsed in Lee. “It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in a religion or its
exercise[.]”104 The Court held that simply granting students the ability to elect a speaker who
may choose to pray “regardless of the students’ ultimate use of it, is not acceptable because of
the social coercive pressures which accompany it. 105 But the Court completely ignores the fact
that any speech which results from these student-elections would be entirely private speech, and
not government speech. The school would have no input as to who is chosen to say what. As
Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, “[a] newly elected student body president, or even a newly
elected prom king or queen, could use opportunities for public speaking to say prayers. Under
the Court's view, the mere grant of power to the students to vote for such offices, in light of the
fear that those elected might publicly pray, violates the Establishment Clause.” 106 The social
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pressures highlighted by the Court in Sante Fe are not equal to coercion by the State. That these
social pressures exist is not in question. Rather, it is whether these social pressures rise to the
level of coercion accompanied by force of law and threat of penalty which was the trademark of
establishments of religion. They do not. As the Court stated in Mergens, “[w]e think that
secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not
endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” 107 Even
if one believes that social pressures felt by students is overwhelming, the State is still not
coercing them in any way. When students unilaterally decide whether prayer should be involved
in a graduation ceremony, the school is left out of the equation. There is no potential for coercion
by the State, because the State is not involved. The students assume any coercive pressures
themselves, and, any penalty to be received is entirely without the force of law.
V.

Why Student-Led Prayer Should Pass Any Test

Consider Debra Weisman’s story that led her to bring suit in Lee v. Weisman. With the
underlying facts of Lee set forth, now adjust them slightly given the subsequent Establishment
Clause cases decided by the Court.
Most importantly, there is a massive distinction between the school inviting a Rabbi to
deliver an invocation at a graduation and if one of Debra Weisman’s classmates had delivered a
prayer.108 When a school invites an outside individual to deliver a message, the reasonable
observer would view this person, and their message, as an extension of the school itself. This is
only compounded by the fact the invitee is a member of the clergy. Inviting a rabbi or a priest to
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deliver an invocation to a graduating class, regardless of whether the prayer is nonsectarian or
not, is far too much entanglement between church and state. If instead Debra Weismann heard a
religious speech from one of her fellow classmates, the analysis would change. Where an
invocation or benediction from a Rabbi chosen by the school tears down the wall of separation
between church and state, a student’s voluntary inclusion of religious messages does not begin to
approach it.
Moving on from who the speaker is, now let us change how the invocation comes to be
delivered. In Lee, Rabbi Gutterman was given a pamphlet entitled “Guidelines for Civic
Occasions” which recommended certain restrictions on the content and topic of his speech before
the school.109 By giving Rabbi Gutterman these guidelines, the Court held that the school was
effectively controlling and directing the content of the prayer, thereby involving the State with
religious activity.110 Restrictions on the content of religious speech at graduations has been seen
in many cases since Lee, as schools try to create a space where students can freely engage in
religious expression while maintaining a nonsectarian appearance.111 The problem with the
guidelines in Lee, and subsequent limitations imposed by schools, is that the school is still
entangled with the religious expression. Restricting or imposing limitations on the content of
religious speech at all will potentially result in a Lemon test failure on either advancement or
inhibition of religion, or excessive entanglement. If the student speaking to Debra Weisman’s
class in this hypothetical instead was given no guidelines or suggestions on the content of the
speech, then the school is not controlling or directing the potential prayer at all. The content of
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the speech, and any religious messages the student elects to include, would come entirely from
the student’s own choice.
Changing the speaker and restrictions on speech in our new hypothetical comports with
the Establishment Clause. But, now, we must ask whether there remains potential for coercion.
In Lee, the Court recognized that, “[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by
any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which do not
so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion as
to have meaningful and practical impact.”112 As was previously noted, the original dangers of
coercion were accompanied by force of law and threat of penalty. Here, the only danger to Debra
Weisman would be for a few moments she would listen to religious invocations by a fellow
classmate. The social pressure potentially felt would be incomparably small to the financial and
legal pressures felt at the time of the amendment’s drafting. Moreover, such speech would come
without any involvement from the state in the religious exercise. The state would have no way to
penalize Ms. Weisman for not agreeing with the religious message, or even actively engaging in
a prayer if one was offered. She would not need to agree with whatever message is being
proffered. In fact, disagreement with the message is directly in line with the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. The State, or the school, would have no way to punish her for disagreeing
with the speaker since they are removed from the process by which the speaker came before her
in the first place. Social pressures, especially in the school-context, are genuine concerns, and for
a student perhaps are the only concerns that matter to them at the time. What they are not,
however, are legitimate legal grounds for denying a student the right to freely engage in religious
expression.
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To add even further to this fact pattern, imagine now that the student who speaks at the
graduation was chosen among a voluntary student election, entirely ran by the graduating class.
To be sure, if the class voted to permit a student to give a speech, then there would be some
students, like Debra Weisman, who fall into the minority. This does not mean, however, that the
minority must convert to whatever religious orthodoxy might be referenced by the elected
student speaker. Nor do the minority of students have to actively participate in the prayer or
show agreement in any way. Just as students do in school buildings every day, Debra Weisman
would be asked to hear an opposing viewpoint. Having to listen to a few minutes of a fellowstudent invoking religious messages is not a concern that should outweigh a student’s ability to
engage in religious expression.
VI.

Conclusion

Regardless of which test a court would choose to employ: Lemon, endorsement, or
coercion, the outcome should be the same. Student-initiated religious speech at a graduation does
not contravene the Establishment Clause and is protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Schools
have tried a myriad of different policies in an effort to permit student expression. Unfortunately,
each of these policies have been struck down by the Supreme Court on coercion or entanglement
grounds. As the Court has noted, however, the fact a policy might “operate unconstitutionally
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.”113 The
tradition and history of public ceremonies in the United States which include prayer is
voluminous, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in most of its school-context
Establishment Clause cases. From the oath taken by civil servants when they assume office, to
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Thanksgiving proclamations proffered by Presidents, religious invocations are commonplace in
American society. Much like these religious acknowledgements, invocations and benedictions as
part of a graduation ceremony have a lengthy and celebrated history. Denying students the
opportunity to voluntarily celebrate their academic achievements through even the slightest
religious invocation deprives them of their right to freedom of expression. Moreover, while the
Supreme Court might be trying to create a more unifying graduation experience, one where the
minority would not feel psychologically coerced, they are in fact achieving the opposite. When a
student, on their own, decides to engage in a religious invocation at a graduation, it is an
opportunity to demonstrate patriotic unity. Students of all faiths may stand or sit, join in prayer
or remain silent, each in their own way celebrating and respecting the religious freedom
promised by the United States Constitution. When that choice is taken from the students, all that
allowed is silence and religious expression is chilled.
A student who wishes to engage in religious speech during a graduation ceremony
unfortunately is met with conflicting advice. The Supreme Court has suggested in recent cases
that psychological coercion is grounds to proscribe the religious speech, while the 2020
Guidelines put forth by the Department of Education suggests that there are contexts in which it
would be tolerated. The student, as well as school administration, is left unsure of which
perspective prevails. Schools who seek to create an environment where freedom of religious
expression is permissible commonly have found themselves subjects of Establishment Clause
suits. This cannot be the reality of religious freedom intended by the First Amendment. Lost
amidst the legal conflict that has surrounded the use of prayer in the school-context, is that there
are children who only want to celebrate their religion with their classmates. Student-sponsored
religious speech at graduations should be celebrated, not silenced. When the school has no input
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in the determination of which student speaks, and what that student says, the inclusion of
religious messages at a graduation speech should be allowed.
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